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Some philosophical questions about paleontology and their 
practica1 consequences 
by Miquel DE RENZI 
Depto. de Geología, Facultad de Ciencias Biológicas, Universidad de Valencia. Burjassot (Valencia). 
This papcr attempts to objectively discuss the actual state ofpaleontology. The 
progress of this science stood still somewhat during the latter part of the last 
century which caused it to develop apart from the biological sciences. an area to 
which it is naturally tied. As aconsequence, this bruought a long-term stagnation, 
because biology, dunng this century, has made great progress and paleontology 
has not During the last 20 years paleontology as a science hasrecuperatedsome 
of this loss, but we as scientists need to be careful in various aspects of its 
development 
En este trabajo se ha intentado hacer un balance de algunos aspectos del estado 
actual de la paleontologia. La historia de la paleontologia muestra un estanca- 
miento a finales del siglo pasado; este estancamiento hizo que nuestra ciencia 
fuera alejándose cada vez más del área de las ciencias biológicas, a las cuales 
estaba ligada naturalmente. Esto trajo, como consecuencia, un importante 
atraso, pues la biologia, durante este siglo, ha dado un gran paso hacia adelante, 
mientras que este no ha sido el caso de la paleontologia. En nuestro pais -y 
posiblemente en muchos otros- la paleontologia es, fundamentalmente, una 
herramienta para datar estratos. Sin embargo, una mala herramienta, pues la 
datación esta basada en las especies fósiles y su determinación se fundamenta en 
el concepto de especie biológica; los fósiles, pero, en muchas ocasiones, son 
usados más bien como sellos o monedas. Salvo excepciones, incluso numerosas, 
en la practica diaria de la paleontologiafaltan conceptos teóricos-mucha gente 
es impulsada a hacer trabajos paleontológicos sin conocimientos básicos de la 
biologia de los grupos que tocan, ni de biologia en sentido amplio-, lo cual da 
como resultado trabajos que, desde un punto de vista cientifico, son inconsisten- 
tes. Creemos que la paleontologia es una ciencia y que su interés fundamental es 
la dimensión histórica de la vida, es decir, el núcleo de la paleontologia no se 
puede realizar sin distinguir los acontecimientos «post-mortemn reflejados en los 
fósiles; es dccu, sin tafonomia. Por otro lado, la historia de la vida sobre la tierra 
queda reflejada en los estratos ordenados en el tiempo, y esto es estudiado por la 
paleontologia estratigráfica, cuyos resultados son muy importantes para la 
paleobiologia Tafonomia, paleobiologia y paleontologia estratigráfica consti- 
tuirian pues la ciencia de la paleontologia. Ciertamente, existe un paradigma 
para la paleobiologia y existen los textosdivulgadores de aquel, pero no ha tenido 
éxito. Y, desgraciadamente, en muchos casos -con excepciones, claro- se 
utiliza con la misma frivolidad con que se utilizaría una moda, pero sin cambios 
en las ideas de base, que en general tienen un mal fundamento teórico. Para 
empezar, se deheria tener en cuenta algunas premisas muy básicas para los 
trabajos paleontológicos que se empiecen a hacer a partir de ahora: asi el estudio 
tafonómico, la población y las muestras, el no caer en el abuso del actualismo y 
del uniformitarismo sustantivos, y Últimamente, el uso critico del aparato 
estadistico. Sin estos puntos de partida la paleontologia no se podrá desarrollar. 
Sin embargo, la paleontologia puede dar, al igual que en otrasepocas, lavisionde 
fenómenos biológicos a gran escala a nivel temporal. La biologia, como tal, 
deberiaseruna sintesis de paleontologia y neontologia, locualdeberiareflejarse 
en la organización de los estudios universitarios de biologia, a pesar de que en 
muchos casos nos encontramos con paleontólogos procedentes del campo de las 
ciencias geológicas. 
En aquest treball s'ha intentat fer un balanc d'alguns aspectes de I'estat de la 
paleontologia. La historia de la paleontologia mostra un estancarnent a les 
darreries del segle passac aquest estancament va Fer que la nostra ciencia s'anes 
allunyant cada cop mes de I'area de les ciencies bii~logiques, amb les qualsestava 
lligada naturalment AixO va portar, com a conseqüencia, un important 
endarreriment, car la biologia, durant aquest segle, ha donat un gran pas 
endavant, mentre que aquest no ha estat el cas de lapaleontologia Al nostre pais 
-i possiblement a molts d'altres- la paleontologia es, fonamentalment, un estn 
per datar estrats. Tanmateix, un mal estri, car la datació es basadaen les especies 
fossils i la seva determinació es fonamenta en el ccncepte d'especie biolbgica; els 
fossils pero en moltes ocasions, són utilitzats mes aviat com si fossin segells o 
monedes. Llevat d'excepcions, fins i tot nombrcses, a la practica diaria de la 
paleontologia li manquen conceptes teorics -niolta gent es impulsada a fer 
treballs paleontologics sense coneixements basics de la biologia dels gmps que 
toquen, ni de biologia en sentit ampli-, la qual cosa dona com a resultat treballs 
que, des d'un punt de bista cientific, son inconsistents. Creiem que la paleontolo 
gia es una ciencia i que el seu interés fonamental es la dimensió historica de la 
vida, es a dir, el nucli de la paleontologia no es pot realitzar sense distingir els 
esdeveniments «post-mortemn reflectits als fossils; es a dir, sense tafonomia. 
D'altra banda, la historia de la vida sobre la terra queda reflectida als estrats 
ordenats en el temps, i aixo es estudiat per la paleontologia estratigrafica, els 
resultats de la qual son molt importants per a la paleobiologia Tafonomia, 
paloeobiologia y paleontologia estratigrafica constituirien doncs la ciencia de la 
Paleontologia Certamenf existeix un paradigmaper a la paleobiologia i delqual 
n'existeixen els textos divulgadors, pero no ha tingut exit 1, malauradamenf en 
molts casos -amb excepcions, es clar- s'utilitza amb la mateixa frivolitat amb 
que hom utilitzaria una moda, pero sense canvis a les idees de base, que en 
general tenen un mal fonament teoric. Caldria, per comencap, fer compte 
d'algunes premises molt basiques per als treballs paleontolbgics que es comencin 
a fer a partir d'ara: aix I'estudi tafonomic, la població i les mostres, el no caure en 
l'abús de I'actualisme i I'uniformitarisme substantius, i darrerament, I'ús critic de 
I'aparell estadistic. Sense aquests punts de partenca lapaleontologia no es podra 
desenvolupar. Tanmateix, la paleobiologia pot donar, al igual que a altres 
epoques, la visió de fenomens biologics de gran escala a nivel1 temporal. La 
biologia com a tal hauria de ser una sintesi de paleontologia i neontologia, la qual 
cosa s'hauria de reflectir en I'organitzacio dels estudis universitaris de biologia, 
malgrat que en molts casos hi hapaleontolegs procedents del campde les ciencies 
geologiques. 
Paleontology is a body of very complex knowledge in our 
century. This body is expanded on many fields and this is the 
cause, at the present moment, of the necessity of drawing any 
kind of schema which shows us the relationships arnong these 
fields. At the same time, this schema should show us the 
hierarchy of such relationships, which are established among 
the diverse studies made by the paleontologists. The absence 
of such a vision can result in abad and useless work, because 
the paleontological research is carried on without giving
previously some necessary footsteps. These questions are
very well set in other sciences; nevertheless, in our poor
paleontology, it is not so ( or it is not so in such a way in many
cases). Perhaps, it is necessary to ask if the word «science» is
applicable to this body of knowledge called paleontology. I
have the belief that paleontology is a science or may become a
science, but the conditions in which this is possible must be
specified.
Under the word «paleontology» there are other areas of
knowledge, and they are really sciences, but the very
paleontology may become a science too. Fossils —the
primary data of paleontology— are geological as well as
biological objects. A student may be paleontologist becoming
a graduate in geology or in biology. That is possible because
fossils are ambivalent objects. Fossils are found in sedimen-
tary rocks and they are useful for important geological
aspects: age of strata and indications about the sedimentary
environment in which were formed the sediments where the
organic remains were buried. Simultaneously, the fossil is
another component of the sedimentary rocks. The actually
fossilized organism could live in the place where the sediment
which buried it, after its death, was deposited. But the organic
remains of living organisms, after the death, could be
transported and deposited in another different place from that
where they lived. The energy of the sedimentary environment
would be the cause of such a transport. In the new place, if
sedimentation was active, the transported remains would be
buried. This last feature makes fossils similar to inorganic
clasts of the sedimentary rocks, while the former makes them
similar to their authigenic components. On the other hand, the
organic remains, before becoming fossils, play a role in the
diagenesis of the sediment, because they have a mineral and
an organic component which react with the other materials of
the sediment until reaching chemical equilibrium. All these
considerations make fossils interesting things in geology.
But fossils are more important as biological objects. Their
very nature is the principal reason for this statement they are
the remains of old organisms and these belonged to popula-
tions of determinate species; their form was adapted, in
general, to an environment and accomplished concrete
functions in their ecological niches. These populations un-
derwent changes in the time; i. e., they evolved. Such
populations, on the other hand, were part of the old ecosys-
tems; these ecosystems changed in specific composition with
the time too; this change is called ecological succession.
All these reflections show that paleontology takes its
knowledges from the fields of biology and geology. At the first
glance, it is not autonomous. However, there are no autono-
mous sciences. Sciences like mathematics or logic, which
apparently seem to depend only on the mind, are not
autonomous; its foundations are derived from certain kinds of
experience (Piaget, 1970). The problem arises in the primacy
of treatment. Which of the aspects of fossils is more
important, the geological or the biological one? The solution
to that is not a manicheistical one. On the other hand, I claim
to show paleontology, and concretely, paleobiology, as a
possible science with specific points of view.
Fossils are actually in sedimentary rocks and we interprete
them now as organisms that lived in an ecosystem placed in an
area of the Earth surface where sedimentation occurred. The
forming sediments buried the dead organisms of the ecosys-
tem and they present themselves together as rocks and fossils
in some place of the Earth. Man has not always considered
this as an obvious truth; I shall speak about the reasons of it in
the next pages. The interpretation of fossils as organic
remains seems today as something of «common sense» —I
use the term «common sense» with all the reserves—, but this
interpretation raises a new problem: the interpretation of the
biological and geological phenomena of the past with the key
of the present phenomena.
In this way, we can ask ourselves about the degree of
uniformity of the Nature during the times; in more familiar
terms: is it valid the uniformitarianism? Paleontology can use
information derived from the actual biological and geological
processes, but we may only consider certain properties as
uniform ones during the times. It means that the uniformita-
rianism must be applied in a restricted sense. This raises a
new question: for the most of the paleontologists, fossils
appear as pure facts. Rudwick, Gould and other authors have
fougth against this coarse empiricism. I shall try to illuminate
this with opinions taken from the philosophy, methodology
and history of science.
A debate is opened. Perhaps, many things presented in this
paper are very discussible. I shall comment the themes that I
have presented in this INTRODUCTION and that I judged
as principal ones. I hope that this paper could be useful for
opening the discussion, but it does not cover all the possible
and important themes, and I am conscious of its mistakes.
This discussion is necessary at the present moment in
paleontology, because the large amount of paleontological
papers accumulated in this century requires a reflection about
the bases —they are not always clear ones— of our work.
WHAT IS PALEONTOLOGY?
We could answer this question in two very different ways:
in a genetic one and in an actual one. I think that the history of
a science could bring more light on the very nature of it than a
simple and an atemporal definition. It is for this reason that I
try by a genetical way to answer this question.
Rudwick (1972) has supplied the materials for such a
genetic response; i. e., by telling us a history of paleontology.
This history shows as many concepts and responses to
questions set up by the fossils, that we see now them as
obvious ones and of «common sense», had been discussed
during more than two centuries.
Rudwick begins his history at the moment in which Gesner,
in the second half•of the XVIth century, published a little
opuscule about the nature of fossils. The main problem in that
epoch was, above all, the classification of the «fossil objects»
in a spectrum which was going from the organic to the
inorganic. The causal explanations of the form of fossils were
secondary ones. On the other hand, the neoplatonism
and the aristotelism supplied sufficient explanation for the
thinking of that epoch. The neoplatonism interpreted fossils
with organic form as an effect of the «sympathy» between
stones and living organisms, but did not interprete them as
remains of living organisms. As Rudwick remarks, it is an
alternative interpretation. The aristotelism saw fossils as the
result of the growth of «seeds» or «gems» of the correspon-
ding living organisms, in the fissures of the rocks of the Earth.
After a century, neoplatonism and aristotelism were over-
come by a new form of interpreting and understanding the
reality: the scientific method developed principally by Gali-
leo Galilei. In this method, there is a neat separation between
observations and hypothesis or explanatory conjectures with
reference to a concrete problem. Such a form of conceiving
fossil objects was carried to the end by Stensen; for this
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naturalist, then, fossils -0bjects iesembling living animals or 
vegetals- were only more or less altered remains of old 
organisms; these remains were subjected to some kind of 
petrifying action, which would explain their stony aspect At 
the same time, he understood the nature of the fossiliferous 
strata sequences and conceived them as a prove of the history 
of the Earth and the life on i t  Hooke was the campion of these 
new ideas in England. However, the precarious knowledge of 
living organisms -in those moments, Nautilus was not yet 
seen, for instance- and the materials from which many 
fossils were formed -very strange, if the origin of fossils was 
a biological one- were an impediment for recognising fossils 
as remains of old living organisms. 
On the other hand, natural theology was ambivalent: 
Nature does not play and its acts are useful; thus, a stony 
object with shell form (a fossil) would not be a ludic activity of 
the Nature, but a thing which served for protecting an animal. 
Therefore, it was correct to interprete fossils as organic 
remains. But, on the other hand, natural theology considered 
living species as the most perfect work of the Creator. If 
fossils should be interpreted as remains of old living orga- 
nisms, then there should have existed extinct species today, 
and this possibility of extinction would be an imperfection of 
the Creation and its Creator. Natural theology was very 
important in England as a frame of reference of thought and 
science, as neoplatonism and aristotelism, for instante, were 
important in the same sense during the XVIth century. The 
debate and the discussion were opened among the competent 
naturalists. Fossils, as interpreted as organic remains, showed 
that species could become extincc at the same time, fossil 
remains had no living similar relatives in many cases. To 
accept them as organic remains was dificult for al1 these 
reasons. 
On the other hand, biblical chronology raised a lot of 
problems to the students of these questions. However, 
biblical chronology impelled the research of the origin and 
history of the Earth. Nevertheless, near the end of the XVIIIth 
century, the organic nature of fossils and the temporal 
broadness of the history of the Earth were already irreversible 
concepts. At the same time, in this epoch and at the 
beginnings of the XIXh century, Cuvier set seriously the 
question of the extinction of the species. He supplied 
important proofs by means of the big fossil quadrupeds, 
because the big living quadrupeds were well known in al1 the 
world In this research, he made use of his new form of 
conceiving the study of the animals: the comparative ana- 
tomy. This one claimed to be a reflexion of the rigour of the 
Newton's mechanics as well as the conceptions of Bacon's 
empirical philosophy, and the ability of reduction of the 
variability in a classification, supplied by the works of Linne. 
Cuvier wanted to explain the extinction of the species by 
means of catastrophical events or revolutions -which were 
nothing more than a translation into the Nature of something 
which was a familiar one for the men of that epoch: the 
political revolutions-, which were not worldly ones. Species 
which replaced the extinguished ones came from other areas 
-not affected by the revolution- by migration. Cuvier 
distinguished severa1 revolutions in the history of the Earth, 
and he conceived this history like a «steady state» as in 
Hutton's ideas. Revolutions would be sea invasions on the 
Earth, which would alternate with calm periods. Hutton's 
ideas would be in accordance with Newton's image of the 
Nature (undirectional changes). The same concepts domina- 
ted the geological science of Lyell. 
Both Lyell and Cuvier became conscious about the need of 
setting the opposite but complementary problem of that of the 
extinction of the species: the problem of the origin of species. 
Cuvier, however, thought that the moment of setting this 
problem had not yet come, because he judged not having 
enough data for i t  Nevertheless, for Lyell, the problem of the 
origin of species cculd not be resolved in that moment, 
because no actual similarprocess was known. 
However, there had already been attempts of formulation 
of hypothesis on the origin of species during Cuvier's time. 
One of them was Geoffroy Saint-Hilaíre's. He conceived the 
transformation of species as oriented by a directional environ- 
mental change, from a warm and uriiform climate towards 
cold and diversified one through the history of the Earth (this 
came from the old theory of the cooling of the Earth), which 
influenced -in an irreversible way- in the transformation of 
living species of the Earth. This last one reflected a lamar- 
ckian concept of life and, the most remarkable: the diversifi- 
cation of faunes and flores was a direct function of the envi- 
ronmental diversification produced by the progressive coo- 
ling of the Earth. On the other hand, the whole process showed 
a strong random aspect 
These random features of the evolutionary thinking were 
not compatible with the model or irnage of life of that epoch. 
Life was something perfect and, above all, this perfection was 
shown, in a striking way, in the adaptation. The argument of 
designfulness was a common place and the naturalists did not 
understand how perfect adaptations could arise by chance. 
Another problem was the place and the origin of Man. If Man 
wouid have had an origin by chance, he would not have been 
morally responsible for his actions and this would be cause of 
trouble of the whole society, which was built on this 
foundation. However, during the coming of Danvin's theory, 
the opposition was, above all, of scientific character, because 
it was not seen the suficiency of the explanations by means of 
the natural selection theory. 
In the middle of the past century, the german geologist 
Bronn studied the fossil record in a phenomenologicai way. 
He tried to see its regularities and from this study inferred the 
existence bf creative forces («Schopfungs-Kraftn) of life. The 
character of these forces was considered as a physical one, 
not vitalist These forces would be of the same nature of 
gravitation or chemical affinity. They were creative because 
they would make innovative changes. Observing its effects, it 
would be possible to know something about its way of action 
and its very nature. From alle these aspects, Bronn concluded 
two laws for the development of life on the Earth: an intrinsec 
law and an extrinsec law. Wallace had observed regularities 
in the fossil record too. For instance, for a given species there 
was, in an immediately anterior time in the fossil record, 
another species very similar to the former. When Wallace 
elaborated, with independency of Darwin, his evolutionary 
ideas, he had no dificulty to explain that regularity as a 
descendency relationship. 
However, the origin of species rested as a problem before 
Danvin. The theories of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire and Lamarck 
were seen as a very inconvenient at phllosophical level. This 
was the reason of the emerging of alternative theories. One of 
them was the theory of the archetypes (of platonical inspira- 
tion) of Owen, which gave explanations for many phenomena 
in the general thinking perspective of the middle XIXth 
century. 
On the other han4 Danvin did not see how the fossil record 
could supply any test to his evolutionary theory. This 
prejudice was a consequence of his lyellian conceptions. 
However, other authors obtained good proof of the evolutie 
nary theory ikom the fossil record. We could cite Gaudry and 
Huxley. Nevertheless, although evolution was already un- 
questionabb:, the explanation of its mechanism did not 
satisfy. The reasons of such an unsatisfaction were, in first 
place, scientifical ones, and in second place, ideslogical ones. 
The state of knowledge for deciding an evolutionary mecha- 
nism was j~dged unsufficient and the scientific community 
preferred to avoid the explanation based on natural selection 
for the origin of species. Other altemative mechanisms 
emerged as evolutionary theorie s. The directionalist theories 
(finalists, ets.), which called on! y for interna1 mechanisms as 
explanation of organic change --internalism and directiona- 
lism are not necessarily depending- were an example of such 
alternatives (Gould, 1977). These altematives were charac- 
terized by its image oflife as sornething different from the rest 
of the physiical world; i. e., as vitalistic conceptions. 
In the sercond half of the XIXth century, however, the 
naturalists claimed to «read» tkie fossil record in an evolutio- 
nary framelaork. Terms like adaptive radiation were born in 
that epoch. But emerged too speculative undesirable con- 
cepts, like tlie recover of the ((soale of beingsv concept and its 
reconversion, by Haeckel, in the biogenetical law. 
The Rudwick's history ends in the second half of the XIXth 
century. From the same author, a history for paleontology in 
the XXth century would be a complex one -and 1 agree with 
him- and it is still for making. Unfortunately, there are not 
yet historical studies for this last period. In the onnly one 
which 1 know (Valentine & and Campbell, 1979), the authors 
recognize that their study is o ~ l y  historiographical. 
If we observe this Rudwick.'~ historical study, we could 
observe thst the first problems which emerged about fossils, 
were prob1c:ms of classification. Fossils should be placed in a 
broad speci,rum from these witll a neat organic appearance to 
those with a purely inorganic aspect, as crystals. It did not 
preoccupy very much, in the XVIth century, that similarity 
with living beings could be an indication for the possibility 
that fossils mere organic remains in its origins. To ad mit this 
possibility for fossils with appearance of marine organisms 
brought perplexity to many students of fossils, because it 
showed thr:m that there coulcl have existed a different dis- 
tribution of seas and continents. At the end of XVIIth cen- 
tury, many authors accepted that fossils of neat organic 
appearance should be considered as remains of old orga- 
nisms, but it led to think thiit, in other times, there were 
species actually extinguished. This was conflictive with 
natural theology, which coniridered species as something 
perfect anci thus, imperishable:. In the XIXth century, it was 
clear that species could become extinct ones, but at this 
moment emerged the problem of their origin, which the 
naturalists tried to solve by means of creationist hypothesis 
(secondaqi causes arbitred by the Creator) or evolutionary 
hypothesis,. These last ones entered in conflict with severa1 
features of the aspirit of the epoch)). 
This little summary of the liistory of paleontology is very 
important for realizing that t le  same «facts»; i. e., fossils, 
have been considered in very different ways according to: a) 
different scientific theories, 2nd b) different philosophical, 
theological or, even, political iconceptions which, at the same 
time, influenced the status of ~~cientific theories or the models 
valid in each epoch and which served for interpreting the 
meaning of fossils. We should not be surprised that before a 
systematic knowledege of the living world, it was dificult to 
distinguisli the living things from those which were not living 
ones. This means that it wzs not very important for the 
students of the Nature in the 'KVIth century, to recognize the 
organic origin of fossils. 
On the other hand, Rudwick's book has shown us that, in 
each moment of the history of the study offossils, it is given a 
conceptual schema about them, according to the status of the 
knowledge and the aspirit of the epoch)). A conceptual 
schema is a theoretical body which is developed from 
observations of facts, even though it transcends them. 
According to Kuhn (1957), the functions of a conceptual 
schema are of two kinds: a) logical ones, and b) psychologi- 
cal ones, and its evolution as such a schema depends on the 
form in which it accomplishes its functions. Conceptual 
economy would be one of its logical functions; therefore, the 
naturalists of the XVIth classified the fossil objects and thus 
reduced the trariability inherent to them: the individuals were 
grouped forming classes and this involved conceptual eco- 
nomy; on the other hand, in a neoplatonic image of the world, 
fossils represented general affinities with other elements of 
Cosmos. Psychological functions depend on the beliefs or 
the incredulities of the scientifist at the time in which he is 
working (we must remember the case of the i~trarzqz~ility 
produced in the scientific circles by the trouble represented by 
the acceptation of the possible extinction os species that, 
together with biological reasons, avoided the recognization of 
fossils with organic aspect as organic remains of old orga- 
nisms until the XVIIIth century). However, as stated by Kuhn 
(op. cit), neither economy nor satisfaction, which the 
conceptual schema is able to give to the scientifist, are 
guarantees of its adequacy with the reality. 
1 shall come back on these grounds and insist deeper in this 
paper. We can see now that fossil students had, in each epoch, 
a conceptual schema of their materials (fossils) and such a 
schema was according to its time (to the intellectual, scientific 
and ideologic frarne of its time). There could be isolated 
advanced conceptions or new facts, but in this case, they 
passed without notoriousness, because the epoch had no 
capacity for integrating them in its general framework of 
thinking. 
1 think that this is the best form -and the most instruc- 
tive- of conceiving the history of science: we must not look 
for the «highway» that runs from the Old age up to a concept 
or theory that we consider correct today, but we must look for, 
in each time, how objects became accessible to the analysis 
(Jacob, 1970). 1 remark that this «to become accessible to the 
analysis)) is, in many cases, a simple change of vision of the 
things, as says Jacob, and it does not necessarily coincide 
with a technological innovation which allowed us to obtnin 
new sources of data. 
It we return to our history, Rudwick (1 972) points out an 
important change of vision at the end of the XIXth century: 
the search for mineral and energetic resources and their 
exploitation made of paleontology an important tool for 
stratigraphy, wich is intimately related with this search. This 
made paleontology to be transformed into a mere instrument 
for datiqg strata; this situation goes on still in general today. 
The consequence of it is that paleontology is farther and 
farther from the field of the biological sciences, which were 
very related to that un ti1 the second half of the XIXth century. 
This fact contributed, by speaking with the same words of 
Rudwick, ato narrow its intellectual horizorzs». 
As we have seen throughout this history and the last 
remarks, paleontology should be considered like ssmething 
closely related to biology. The intense use of fossils for dating 
strata only served for deviating paleontology from its true 
scientifical interests, including stratigraphical paleontology. 
We can see that such interests had been placed on the grounds 
of biology. The use of fossils for dating rocks had begun very 
recently, in the first years of the XIXth century. William 
Smith and Georges Cuvier were the first naturalists who tried 
the correlation and dating of sedimentary strata; Cuvier was 
interested in such an objective because he looked for evidence 
in order to prove the very nature of his «revolutions». 
We can now answer in a more concrete way the question: 
what is paleontology? Paleontology, we could say, is funda- 
mentallypaleobiology, or in other terms, it is the study of the 
historicaldimension oflife on theEarth. As Rudwick(1972) 
and Gould(1977) state, the problems of a determined science 
are well already set from the first men who worked seriously 
in that area. Thus, the classification of fossils was one of the 
first problems faced by their students, but today, systematics 
is a very important activity. The ecological and functional 
problems raised by bossils preoccupied Cuvier and other 
naturalists; the problem of the origin of species was more and 
more urgent when the fossil record was studied deeper and 
more and more extinct species were discovered On the otjher 
hand, the use of fossils for the chronology os the history of the 
Earth was already made by Stensen. As a last question, how 
fossils were formed was one of the first problems already set 
since Gesner's times. 
As a conclusion, we realize that paleontological problems 
are of three basical kinds: those referred to the origin of 
fossils, those raised by its biological meaning and those raised 
by their position in the geological time. This last one is very 
important when we want to consider life as a temporal and 
evolutionary process. Therefore, paleontology can be con- 
ceived as it follows: 
1. The study of the way how organisms pass from the 
biosphere to the lithosphere, or taphonomy. 
2. The study of the biological meaning of fossils, or 
paleo biology. 
3. The study of the place of fossils in the geological time, or 
stratigraphical paleontology. 
We should remark that paleobiology is the nucleus of 
palentology; when we know how is produced the fossilization 
-or taphonomic process- of the remains found in a deposit 
and which its place in the geological time, the problems raised 
by those fossils will be absolutely biological ones. Only the 
resolution of such problems will allow to use fossils in 
geological applications, such as more precise subdivisions of 
the geological time. If we work in this way, paleontology shall 
come back to occupy its place as biological science the Earth, 
which was lost in the second half of the past century, when 
paleontology became a simple and rutinary instrument of 
application to geological problems. 
In the next paragraph, 1 shall justify and make clear al1 
these statements. 
MUST THE ACTIVITY O F  THE PALEONTOLOGIST 
FOLLOW AN ORDER? 
The basic problems of paleontology, as we have set them at 
the end of the last paragraph, do not suppose an indiscrimina- 
ted accessibility. We can distinguish here a hierarchical 
structure, although there are some feed-bak in i t  It is 
important to remark that it is impossible to make paleobiole 
gical studies without having previously realized the taphone 
mic study. This has been stated severa1 times (Lawrence, 
1971; De Renzi, et al., 1975; De Renzi, 1978) and it is 
necessary to attack in this way the problem. However, to 
recognize the diagenetic aspects suppose a previous paleobie 
logical knswledge: that of the chemistry and mineralogy as 
well as the microstructures of the hard parts of the organisms, 
which we found posteriocly fossilized. This means that those 
aspects (chemistry, microstructures, etc.) have to be conside- 
red as reasonably invariable for each phylum. For this reason, 
Sorauf (1971) had doubts about the primary mineralogical 
nature of the Rugosa. The problem was that a very well 
preserved specimens of rugose corals, showing very delicate 
features of the septa, were preserved in calcitic material. In 
Scleractinia, al1 the members of the order build their skeletons 
with aragonite, and they have trabecular microstructures as 
well as the rugose corals object the considerations. Thus, 
there arises the problem of if trabecular microstructures could 
only be constructed with aragonite or it is possible to build 
them with calcite tso. The conservatism of aragonite for 
actual and fossil (no Rugosa) trabeculiar skeletons of corals is 
a motive of the discussion of Sorauf s paper, which deals with 
the possibility of a diagenetic ion-teion process. In the 
Conodontophorida, the radular hypothesis was discussed in 
one of its points, because conodonts are phosphatic ones, with 
evidence of primary mineral, while mollusc radules are 
chitinous ones, although convergence between radules and 
certain assemblages of conodonts could be remarkable 
(Tasch, 1973). A last example: when in a fossil mollusc is 
seen a layer of spany calcite among prismatic or foliated 
layers, we consider, with whole probability, that it was 
aragonitic material and that this shell was a bimineralic one, 
because it is never found a mollusc or other remains of hard 
animal parts with a sparitic microstmcture. 
Al1 these examples shows us how certain kinds of paleobie 
logical aspects supply information about taphonomic p r e  
cesses. It is not only about diagenesis, but biostratinomy too; 
there are some biotic aspects which can te11 us something 
about transport For instance, the organisms in life position; 
determined organisms have positions not due to mechanical 
origin during life; thus, man) infaunal bivalves live buried 
with the commisure orthogonal to the surface of the sea floor, 
this floor will become the surface of a bed or paralell to i t  This 
position is an anomalous one; if in a fossiliferous bed this 
position is repeated with a high frequency for al1 the 
individuals of the same species and these are more or less 
regularly separated among them by the sediment, this conclu- 
des that, with security, such specimens were in life position 
and we can consider them as autochtonous; i. e., we are faced 
with elements of a paleobiocenosis. An exarnple would be 
Psezu.!omiltha (?) corbarica (Leymerie) from the beds of the 
lower Ilerdian of Tremp (Catalunyh Spain) (De Renzi, 
1975). 
Nevertheless, the taphonomic study must precede not only 
the paleobiological one, but the biostratigraphic too. The 
application of the criterion of curves of size frequency is well 
known(the distinction-by means of these curves- between 
paleobiocenosis and thanatocenosis, as explained by Johnson 
(1960) and Fagerstrom(l964) ) in taphonomy. Really, these 
curves masked paleobiological features which must be elu- 
cidated a posteriori of the taphonomical study. Raup and 
Stanley (1 97 1) show how these curves are the result -in a 
biocenosis-- of the combination of a growth curve and a sur- 
vivorship cunJe; so, these curves can be explained as biologi- 
cal phenomena and not as demostrative of a transport, which 
is a ~ure lv  sedimentolonical event. We must remember that a 
good bioStratigraphy mist recognize the autochtonous, rese- 
dimented or reworked character of the fossils used in order to 
date strata. In this sense, we have two papers on jurassic 
biostratigraphy that distinguish taphonomic events as useful 
ones in the biostratigraphic inteipretation (Fernández-Lbpez 
and Suárez-Vega, 1979; Fernández-Lbpez, 1979). 
Al1 these questions bring us to speak about certain 
properties of organisms -and of many biological pheno- 
mena- as reasonably invariable during the geological time. 
For this motive, we can use theni as orientative in the research 
of taphononlic phenomena, bui. it is in a minimurn grade. 
If we reconsider the histoiy of paleontology, we can 
observe certainly, that the first problems set by the fossils 
were those (3f presewation or origin (today, we would speak 
about them in taphonomy). On the other hand, we would have 
problems about the situation of fossils in the geological time. 
These problems drive directly 1.0 those of the extinction and 
the origin of species and also to the problems of adaptation 
and so on. Thus, we can reccignize the priority of placing 
fossils in a determinate chronological scale. However, this 
makes clear that the nucleus ofpaleontologicalproblems is 
of biologic~fl nature. 
Why is it necessary, in mosl. of the cases, a chronostrati- 
graphy before attacking paleobiological problems? Because 
many of these problems supposc:processes and these last ones 
are developed during the time. On the other hand, similar 
processes could take place in very different temporal inter- 
vals. If we do not precise our chronology, we could easily 
confuse two different processes in only one. For instance, 
speciation events, as conceived by Eldredge and Gould 
(1 972) and Gould and Eldredge (1 977), involve the know- 
ledge of the palecbiogeographical distribution of species 
during temporal intewals well known. Paleoecological pro- 
blems, at ,s synthesis level, require good datations; so, 
opportunistic species, for instante, are restricted to narrow 
chronostratigraphic intewals (Alexander, 1977). I t  should 
not be necessary to say that paleobiogeography studies the 
distribution of animal or vegetal groups and its causes in the 
whole worl4 or in a part of it, during their existence in the 
geological time. 
RELATIONSHIPS O F  PALEONTOLOGY TO ITS 
CLASSICAL AND M O D E F !  APPLICATIONS 
The datiiig of strata is made by means of fossils too. We 
must remark that this applicaticin of paleontology is an impor- 
tant one when we want to make precise divisions in the geolo- 
gical time. 19s a logical conclusion, the disposition of the bio- 
logical eveiits on the Earth in a precise order, requires this 
application, although it would not be possible without the 
basic body of paleontology. The fundamental problem of such 
a kind of aating strata is that of having, in each moment, 
species with broad spatial distribution and narrow vertical 
distribution, or with well known point of departure, although 
the vertical distribution was large. However, important 
features of the actual species; remain unknown for many 
paleontologists, and this is unfortunately a fact These 
problems, in the case of fossils, become paleobiological ones 
and the 1ac:k of knowledge of many practisers of «applied 
paleontology)) in this field has not allowed, in many cases, a 
good use of fossils as time inarkers. So, such important 
features like the polymorphisni of the species and its related 
conseauence. the clines. whicli in manv cases are confused 
with phy~etic'evo~ution(~ith a l;radualikc character). This is 
the conseaiience of a naive «reading» of the sedirnentarv and 
fossil rec&ids in their vertical dimeniion and it could be(ánd it 
is still) the cause of many mistakes when fossils are used in 
biostratigraiphy, as remarked Eldredge and Gould (1977). 
1 want to set another important question in this comtext: the 
evaluation of the absence of an index fossil. I t  can be caused 
by two factors: 1) Ecological or biogeographical conditions, 
which prevented that organism to live in that area. 11) 
Biostratinomical or diagenetical conditions (which belong to 
taphonomy) which prevented the presewation of that orga- 
nism. In this last case, we must be pmdent -it is necessary 
when we are in doubtful or limotrophy situations-, because 
we shall not be able to decide surely its absence. 
On the other hand, plate tectonics, paleontology, and thcir 
relationships with dating of rocks are very complex. The sin of 
many biostratigraphers is to forget that «the stratigrapher- 
paleontologist observes age relationships only i11 a local 
section where visible superposition establishes a succession 
of species. These successions form the central pier of 
correlation; al1 else is deduction and hypothesisn (Beer- 
bower, 1968; the underlined of his text is ours). In a given 
moment of time -delimitated by means of common index 
fossils- we can know, by means of distributions of concrete 
organisms, the degree of union or separation of plates. 
However, this would require precise systematic determina- 
tions of species of the groups with which we deal. Wc must 
also evaluate the absences, referred to impossibility of 
presence, because environmental conditions are not available 
in a determined place as well as by the action of thc 
taphonomical process. In this last point, Raup and Marshall 
(1980) remark as Marsupialia and Rodentia do not give 
easily preservable forms; it is not so in the case of Perisso- 
dactyla. 
Lately, since a few years ago, it is frequent the research on 
the geophysic aspects of past geological times, concretely 
about Earth's rotation. We must remark several authors and 
papers as pioneers in this field, as Farrow (1 97 1,1972) up to 
those published in Rosenberg and Runcorn (1975). It is 
interesting, in the first place, to place chronologically the 
astronomical events, and for this it is necessary to obtain good 
chronostratigraphical datations. But the crucial question is to 
recognize lamellae or growth rings in bivalves, corals and 
other groups. We must evaluate the seasonal or daily 
character of the production of sucb features; it is a biological 
(and paleobiological) problem, but taphonomy must indicate 
us the primary or diagenetic character of the structures in this 
evaluation. The obtained results shall have also paleontole 
gical consequences. 
Al1 these questions are not the only ones of the very broad 
extension of the relationships and hierarchies among the 
severa1 fields of paleontology and the relationships among 
paleontology and its classical or more modern applications. 
However, paleobiology, which is the central point where we 
are always going to end up, appears to us as a black box. The 
dilucidation of the origin of fossils involves fundamentally 
sedimentological data, because the dead organisms behave in 
an inert way; the environmental agents play with them as if 
they were clasts. On the other hand, the basic philosophy of 
stratigraphical paleontology is, since Stensen, the strata 
sequence, but the correct determination of fossil species is the 
most important in stratigraphical paleontology, but it is a 
paleobiological problem In a later paragraph 1 shall speak 
about paleobiology as a central part of the paleontological 
science. Nevertheless, before 1 attack this problem, 1 shail 
have to discuss broadly some previous aspects involved in the 
present paper. Figure 1 is an attempt to show a schema of 
relationships among the parts of paleontology and between 
paleontology and some of its applications to geological 
sciences. 
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Fig. 1. Some possible relationships among the diverse parts ofpaleontology, and 
among these and some of its applications to geological sciences. The continuous 
arrows indicate the primary sense of the relationship. The dot lines indicate the 
need of the relationship in inverted sense, when the first type of relationship has 
already been estahlished 
INTERMEZZO: THE NATURE O F  SCIENCE 
AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
Our principal preoccupation is the scientific character of 
this that we speak of under the narne paleontology. We have 
just said that paleobiology would be its central part. It is for 
this reason that we must already attack -before trying to 
establish the nature and methods of paleobiology- two 
questions: a) What is science? and b) What is the scientific 
method? It is evident that 1 do not treat these themes in its 
whole broadness. Such a matter would be above this simple 
paper. On the other hand, the exhaustive treatrnent of these 
themes overcome completely the author's competences. 
However, 1 think that every scientist should set hirnself some 
basic reflections about science and the scientific method. This 
should not be a spontaneous matter, but a serious one. Every 
scientist has a philosophy of science, and this philosophy 
guides him -although, in many times, he is not conscious of 
it- in his form of acquiring knowledge from the world. In 
many cases, it can underlie a very coarse empiricism and 
pragmatism in the way of acting of many scientists. At the 
same time, they seem to ignore the name of their attitudes; 
these ones are not philosophical questions for them, but 
obvious bases of science. 
In this paragraph 1 want to give a vision of the nature of 
science, which could be useful for making to advance 
paleontology as a science. 1 have said that the problem is 
complex and it is not meant for giving an exhaustive vision of 
i t  Nevertheless, 1 want to centre the problem in two 
fundamental disjunctives: there would be two basical altema- 
tives about science; the first of them states that we can «read» 
directly in the Nature, while the second one states that such a 
direct «reading» is not possible. For those who support the 
first altemative, the induction -for deciphering and unders- 
tanding the world which is around of us- is enough. The 
induction is accumulation of particular cases and, from them, 
obtention of general statements; for the inductivists, scientifi- 
cal theories are only a summary of data and can be directly 
obtained from the tables of numbers comingfrom laboratories 
(or obsemations in the field). This means that theories are 
«discovered» and not «created» (Bunge, 1973). This position 
would be impregnated of empiricism, because the direct 
«reading» of the Nature involves a faith without lirnitations in 
the «pure» observations and facts. This faith is the cause of 
the fact that scientists who embrace it, think that concepts in a 
determined science have only meaning in the case which they 
can be defined operationally. Thus, any concept not defined 
by means of empirical operations, has no meaning in that 
science -this has been shown in physics by Bunge (1973). 
On the other hand, the second position claims that the 
reality is not given to us immediately, but the resolution of the 
scientifical problems requires hyothesis which go farther on 
of facts for explaining them. From these statements, al1 
observation (Popper, 1958) is brought under the light of 
theories (it is the opposite of the inductivists, who believe in a 
language which speaks about facts (phenomenistic), free of 
theories). The previous Popper's statement is paraphrased by 
Eldredge and Gould (1972): «al1 obsemation is colored by 
theory and expectation)). 
Must we believe in any of these alternatives? Which is the 
state of our science? Paleontology has gone through a long 
way -during our century- in the field of its biostratigraphi- 
cal applications, as we saw at  the end of the summary of 
Rudwick's history, in this same paper. Biostratigraphical 
research was needed in an utilitarian way and paleontology 
was limited to the search of fossils in order to date rocks. This 
involved, in a large scale, a direct c<reading» of the fossil 
record and the primacy of obsemation above theorization 
(search for oil, with the competition of rival companies, was 
not the ideal situation for a correct practice of science). 
However, paleontology, as a science, had not gone through its 
way; paleontology depended on the development of biology 
and that of the related geological disciplines; thus, the 
«reading» of the fossil record could be mistaken by precon- 
ceived and unverified ideas. Therefore, the use of fossils 
could give good results in a short period, but in a long period, 
serious incoherences could be detected. Such incoherences 
--as 1 shall show in the following paiagraphs- 1 think that 
are due to the lack of a good theory which rules the search for 
facts and obsemations, and which was susceptible of criticism 
for its foundations. On the other han4 incoherences have a 
theoretical ground: that which ruled when the development of 
paleontology was stopped as biological source of problems. 
Here, history of science is useful again, because it shows us a 
development -a rational reconstruction of it- and from it 
we can judge or evaluate two rival msthodologies (interpre- 
ting such a development normntively; i. e., from a determined 
methodology; see Lakatos, 197 1 ) in a manner that we can see 
which way is a cul-de-sac and which abandoned way, if we 
come back it, can lead to real progress in the considered 
scientifical field. 
The idea of the scientifical method, which 1 am going to 
expose here will be that which gives priority to the theory and 
does not search for data and observations only for itself. Such 
an idea is a summary of the methodological concepts exposed 
by Bunge (1969), but acctually they come since Galileo 
Galilei. Briefly, we can say that science begins with p r p  
blems; a problem is set when in a fíeld of our knowledge there 
arises a question which is not explained by the previous 
knowledge (for instance, a new object -what is this?-; 
localization of something -where is this?-; how it takes 
place the action of something?, and so on). From here, we 
shall make conjetures which allow us to find the solution of 
the problem (for instance, to suppose that the action of 
something is the succession of a series of well specified events 
imagined by us); these conjectures are called hypothesis. 
However, a i~d  this point is essential, hypothesis must be 
tested Hypothesis cannot be made in whatever way, as 
severa1 currents of philosophy of science state, but they have 
to be compatible orzes with the body of relevant knowledge in 
the moment in which we forrnulate the hypothesis. For 
testing hypothesis, we shall arbitrate techniques -this is our 
true link with experience, which is fully necessary; we cannot 
build a factzlal science with onirypaper andpencil- which 
can be empirical or conceptual ones. These techniques are 
available in the previous body of knowledge. Empirical 
techniques are referred to the iise of instruments, chemical 
reactives, and so on, for throwing light on the validity or 
invalidity of our hypothesis. Nevertheless, the conceptual 
techniques iillow to enunciate with precision problems or 
make procedures for obtaining consequences from the hype 
thesis and evaluating results f ~ o m  observation and experi- 
mentation which, with a simple 'lance, we cannot evaluate. In 
this sense, ;in important conceptual technique is statistics, 
and we shall latter speak about it, referring to its use (good and 
bad) in Paleiontology. 
Thus, hypothesis are not only very interesting in itself, but 
they are in their consequences too. It is important to remark 
that hypothesis are more and more useful when they have less 
and less obaervational terms in its formulation. Thus, useful 
hypothesis have many non-empirical terms. History of 
biology illustrates us with the example of the genetical 
discoveries of Mendel. He postulated the existence of not 
visible paríicles as responsible for the transmission of 
hereditary characters; nevertheless, consequences derived 
from their existence were suscc?ptible to observation -and 
thus, hypothesis could be tested- by means of adequate 
techniques which made them evident. The process led to 
success in the dilucidation of the heredity (Jacob, 1970). 
Definitely, among severa1 hypothesis, we can evaluate 
them by means of testing them; it is also necessary to do the 
same thing for the techniques used for this purpose. It is 
evident that our problem will be explained in the general 
frame of knowledge which pro~oked it, and this solution will 
increase oul- body of knowledge. However, our research shall 
have only solved the problem partially. On the other hand, 
this research raises new problems and their solutions would 
be able to show that hypothesis used for the solution of 
previous prublems were valid ones only in a partial way or 
1 KNOWLEDGE / 
Fig. 2. Schenia of the scientific method (from Bunge, 1969). 
absolutely invalid ones (we must remember that the concept 
of fossil, in the Renaissance, explained correctly many things 
in the context of knowledge of that epoch). 
This would be a general schema of scientific method which 
-1 believe- can drive us towards a good development of 
paleontology; figure 2 gives a plastic idea of i t  1 believe to 
detect such a form of conceiving paleontology in many 
modern papers published in determined journals (Palaeon- 
tology, Journal ofPaleontology, Paleobiology, Lethaia, and 
other ones). Nevertheless, on the other hand, there is a lot of 
rutinary paleontological work: description of faunes and 
flores from more or less wide areas, purely biostratigraphic 
papers, etc. Apparently, they seem rutinary work, but latter, 1 
shall show their scientifical or non-scientifical character, 
according to what immediately 1 am going to develop. 
The next footstep is referred to the hypothesis highly tested 
and verified. In this situation, we can accept them as true 
objective schemes of the reality, and these hypothesis are t h e  
se which we cal1 laws. There are not only laws; science begins 
establishing regularities -for example, that discovered by 
Wallace: a fossil species has another very related with it in an 
immediately anterior geological time- and these regularities 
are only summaries of very concrete data. The propositions 
which enunciate such regularities are called er~zpirical gene- 
ralizations or leve1 O hypothesis (Woodger, 1978). 
HlGH LEVEL HYPOTHESIS  
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Fig. 3.  Schema of the logic structure of a scientific theory(from Bunge, 1969). 
When in a science we have a set of hipothesis os high 
degree of confirmation or laws, then it is very important to try 
the articulation among them; i. e., we must know if we can 
deduct al1 these laws from a minimum of initial suppositions. 
This deductibility leads us to show relationships among laws, 
that in another way they cannot be shown. These relationships 
affect those concepts on which those laws are based. For this 
reason, concepts appearently no related, become linked. 
Such new relationships can open, in its time, new ways of 
research. If we succeed that the body of knowledge could 
attain such a structure, which allows to deduct a11 its laws 
from a little number of basic principles which, in its time, 
contain the basic concepts of that science, we shall say that 
we have built a theory on the body ofknowledge of some area 
of the reality. The basic principles from which we build thc 
theory are not generally deductible among them; they arc 
called axioms. The concept of axiomatic theory is not related 
with a sclerotic structure, impossible to correct it. The 
ordination of a set of laws as a theory or system allows to 
clarify and ordinate al1 the knowledge from that field, in such a 
way that easily al1 the weak points of such a system come to 
light, and thus it points out to us new problems and research 
lines. Al1 this can even affect the axioms of the theory in such 
a way that it changes one or severa1 axioms, or introduces new 
ones. Therefore, the knowledge of a field of reality changes its 
form, though the first successes could remain in a radically 
new theory. 1 give only two examples: the relativity theory 
would be a general one which would cover al1 those pheno- 
mena studied by the newtonian mechanics, and another area 
of phenomena which had not been considered by the newto- 
nian mechanics at first On the other hand, newtonian 
mechanics failed as explanation of this last kind of phene 
mena. From new bases, Einstein built a different theory 
which contained newtonian mechanics. 
Another case would be genetics. Mendel formulated 
severa1 hypothesis about the hereditary material, which he 
considered as immutable. The discovery of mutations by De 
Vries altered radically the primitive conception of the here- 
dity. However, in absence of mutations, Mendel's laws went 
on accomplishing themselves and that was a particular case of 
heredity. 
Al1 this seems to indicate that the progress in a science is 
founded in the obtention of basic concepts for this science; the 
basic concepts are really not referred to observable things 
either. The way of conceiving the hereditary material by 
Mendel was not something susceptible to direct observation- 
and it is not susceptible either now (Ruse, 1973), but the 
consequences of such a conception are valid and foud al1 the 
modern genetics. For al1 this, 1 betieve that a scientifical 
paleontology must be based on such principles. Thus, it is 
difficult that the mere search for data could conduce to a right 
term. If we come back to the history of paleontology for 
evaluating methodologies (in the sense of Lakatos before 
cited), we shall see that in our century there flourished the 
accumulation of a big mass of data, but without any rational 
conceptual schema which allows us to organize them. When 
the things have escaped far from our hands, it is difficult but 
not impossible, to try looking for a form of organization of our 
knowledge about the history of life, under the light of some 
basic principles. 
PALEOBIOLOGY AS THE CORE 
O F  PALEONTOLOGY 
Paleobiology means ((biology of old organisms)). The basic 
problem consists in knowing if it is possible, a knowledge of 
such a biology. However, another and principal problem will 
be what we understand as biology. 
Old organisms present to us themselves as fossilizable hard 
parts; the animal which was protected by those or which 
contained them is not preserved in general. As for the fossil 
vegetals, we have major information at histological level. In 
the case of the animal fossil remains we have, nevertheless, 
the chance that, in many times, these hard parts presemed as 
fossils are considered to be very important elements in the life 
of the organism to which they belong. Such an importance is 
shown by the strong correlations among these hard parts and 
the rest of animal. Thus, a bivalve shell possesses a reparti- 
tion of muscle scars in its interior, and this repartition is very 
well correlated with the anatomy of living animal, in such a 
way that we can reasonably predict it in absence of the animal 
(Kauffman, 1969). Another example of group which allows 
such a kind of predictability are brachiopods. Muscle scars, 
brachidia, and other features of the shell of these animals are 
very correlated with the living animal too; if we consider that 
they have a very lhtle representation, al1 these aspects well 
understood open to us the way for understanding of the 
numerous extinct brachiopods (Rudwick, 1970). 
However, we must advance something about that which 
we understand as biology, before speaking on paleobiology. 
From a general point of view, we shall be able to say that 
biology studies living organisms, and they have character of 
living systems; according to Waddington (1 968), they would 
be characterized by containing codified information, respon- 
sible of the main feature of living systems: reproduction. This 
codified information is hereditarily transmitted and is suscep 
tible to become altered and transmit later hereditarily such 
alterations. This information, codified in a genotype, origins 
specific substances which interact among them and with the 
physical environment, and this is the origin of thephenotype. 
Living systems, as defined above, are susceptible of 
undergoing changes which can transmit to their descendents, 
and this means evolution. At the same time, Waddington 
remarks that phenotype results from the interaction of the 
genotype with the physical environment. On the other han4 it 
is important to remark that each living system is not isolated, 
but it interchanges matter and energy with its environment 
and, at <le same time, coexists with other living systems. 
In a certain place of Earth, we shall generally see many living 
systems, which can put together in discrite groups; i. e., each 
discrete group belongs to apopulation of a determined spe- 
cies. The set of living systems in a determined area, which 
changes matter and energy with its physical environrnent and 
which is maintaining its structure -based on the relationships 
established among its component populations- is called eccF 
system. Ecological theory is established about the ecosystem 
and its properties, such as stability, diversity, and so on. 
Living organisms transmit their information, but another 
basic characteristic, as we said, is evolution. However, the 
modem trends in evolutionary studies remark more and more 
the need of considering organic evolution into the frame of the 
ecosystems; thus, evolution must be considered in the context 
of ecological theory. Organic changes would not be, in many 
cases, direct responses to variations of physical environment 
(physicalism, physicalists, as Gould (1977) called this 
position and those which hold it), but caused by modifications 
of the structure of the ecosystem. 
We have here two great theoretical bodies: evolutionary 
theory and ecological theory. Ruse (1973) remarked that 
evolutionary theory has a wholly unified structure which 
allows to reach its axiomatization. If we do not have in 
account his reductionism of organic evolution to population 
genetics, we believe that his idea about the unified character 
of the evolutionary theory is true. The distinction of macre 
evolutionary phenomena from those microevolutionary ones 
means recognizing different levels in the evolutionary con- 
text This idea has been formulated years ago in some papers 
and books (Eldredge and Gould, 1972; Gould and Eldredge, 
1977; Stanley, 1975, 1979; Gould, 1980, etc.). That is no 
obstacle in order that those new ideas could produce, and in 
fact produce, a unified vision in the new level, and relation- 
ship with the lower and upper levels Gould(1980) recognizes 
three levels in the evolutionary hierarchy, separated by two 
discontinuities: the Goldschmidt break (between change in 
populations and speciation) and the Wright break (between 
speciation and trends as differential success among species). 
On the other hand, referring to ecological theory, Margalef 
(1968, 1980) has drawn an importarit line in this context 
This author remarks as the actual hknowledge of ecology can 
acquire a meaning and an integration in the framework of an 
ecological theory. He also states that such a theory overce 
mes the field of classical empiriciil ecology. The same author 
refers to syslems as objects of study of ecological theory. 
Thus, we haive that, the other principal aspect of living 
organisms, that of forming asserriblages of individuals inside 
of the different physical environnnents, in is also covered in a 
very concrete way at theoretical level. 
The features considered until now bring us to conclude that 
present biology, as body of knowledge, could be organized as 
a theory. In this last consideration, the two partial theories 
-the ecological and the evolutionary theories- would 
integrate al1 the bodies of existei~t biological data (figure 4). 
Such a synthesis could be called biology in a restrictive sense. 
1 shall speak of a broader sense when is fully accepted a 
temporal diniension of life on the Earth. 
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Fig. 4. The thi:oretical organization of biology (in restricted sense). 
Gould (1'977) has shown as a very important phenomenon 
for the evoli~tion, such as heterochrony, is very related to life 
strategies r or K, which are followed by the species in which 
heterochroriy takes place. The same author, in the same work, 
and Frazzetta (1975), rema,ik the importance of these 
strategies fior explaining the sidaptation events in general. 
Schopf (1 9'17) treats evolution of Bryozoa in identical terms. 
These statements show only a sample of the affirmation that 
realized be fore. 
A PARADIGM FOR PALEOBIOLOGY 
((Paleontology is not geology, it is zoology or botany, it 
succeeds only so far as it is pursued in the zoological and 
biological spirit)). 
OSBOiGV quoted by SCNOPP (19?2). 
If the synthesis of ecological and evolutionary theories 
would constitute an integrating paradigm of the principal 
aspects of biology, 1 think that it would be possible to do 
something similar for paleobiology. In this last case, fossils 
can be interpreted under the form of temporal succession of 
living forms and, at the same time, the geological paradigm of 
plate tectonics (Valentine and Campbell, 1979) allows to 
place spacially the living organisms in any moment of the 
past. Thus, just as biology -in restrictive sense- can only 
have in account the spacial dimension, paleobiology can 
place their events in a space-temporal framework. 
Some years ago, Margalef set a schema for paleontology, 
which would consist in an integration of paleobiogeography, 
paleoecology and evolutionary paleontology, for any moment 
of the geological time. Margalef s conception was taken by 
Lawrence (1971) and we claim to present it as a base of a 
paradigm for paleobiology. 
After Kuhn (1 963), a paradigrn is a theory or an embryo of 
theory emerging in a concrete moment which, giving reason of 
enough phenomena of an area of the reality -without 
connections until that moment- influences in a positive way 
in the scientific community that studies that sector, in such a 
form that this theoretical body manage to rule the research in 
that area in a coherent manner, because it is open to new 
ways. 1 want to make now two statements: a) that the 
paradigm, in its first condition (theory or embryo of theory) 
already exists, during severa1 years, for paleobiology, and b) 
that the principal geological application of paleontology in 
this century -to date rocks by means of fossils- cannot 
ignore this paradigm without becoming a useless routine. We 
could summarize this last statement in the sense that a 
paleontologist is not necessarily a biostratigrapher, but, 
however, a biostratigrapher must be a fortiori a paleontole 
gist (in the sense of including taphonomy and paleobiology in 
his daily work); i. e., he must use fossils as remains of old 
organisms, not as mere «fossil objects)) Rudwick(1972) talks 
about «fossil objects)) in refemng to the ideas on them along 
the second half of XVW century; in that moment, students of 
fossils were preoccupied in placing those in a very broad 
spectrum. That was very progressive in that time; however, 
such an attitude would be today radically negative; see the 
paragraph WHAT IS PALEONTOLOGY? at the beginning 
of this paper). 
1 want to justify the two statements a) and b) that 1 have 
enunciated before. As to a), a sketch of an organization of the 
paleontological studies, on the grouads of the integration of 
paleoecology, paleobiogeography and evolutionary paleon- 
tology, is already given. We would have to say that paleobis 
geography would be already covered by paleoecology and 
plate tectonics. This would be according to the synthesis of 
ecological and evolutionary theories, which we proposed 
before, like an organization of biology as a scientifical theory 
in a restrictive sense. Thus, the evolution is shswn in the 
space and time by paleobiology. In that sense, Krshn (1979) 
has remarked severa1 ideas about integration of evolutionary 
and ecological theories. 
According to Kuhn (1963), the vectors of paradigms are 
the textbooks. A very interesting sketch of modern paleobie 
logy was published severa1 years ago under the form of 
textbook (Beerbower, 1960). On the other hand, the second 
important pioneer in this sense is the book of Raup and 
Stanley (1971). In this last one, the study of organic form 
receives a special treatment If we have in account that the 
Beerbowers's textbook is previous to those first Rudwick's 
papers on functional morphology and Raup's papers on 
theoretical morphology, its originality is shown in a patent 
marner. Another important synthesis is Valentine's (1973) 
book; in it there appears a connection among ecology, 
evolution and plate tectonics. In the three textbooks, ecologi- 
cal and evolutionary aspects cover al1 the other themes. The 
organic form displays its characters, ruled directly or indi- 
rectly by the genes; mechanical aspects in the developmentof 
the organic form (Thompson, 1917 and Gould, 1970, in 
biology and paleontology, respectively) do not mean that 
such aspects are not genetically governed. This would be 
translated in the concept of adaptability (Frazzetta, 1975); 
thus, these genes are going to be object of natural selection, 
and the result of their action will be the adequation of living 
organisms possessing such a form -resulting from the 
development- in the diverse ecosystems which constitute 
the biosphere. In Europe there have been textbooks in order 
to diffuse these conceptions; 1 want to cite, among other 
books, those of Babin (1971) and Roger (1974). 
Fossils and their devosit conditions suvvlv us data for 
reaching such a paleob~ological integratioi Here, a second 
problem menaces us: that of the uniformitarianism, which we 
shall treat apa-rt, by reason of its capital importance in the 
practice of paleobiological studies. 
Thus, we have a proposition well founded and real of 
elaborating a science of paleobiology. The inclusion of the 
temporal dimension would distinguish paleobiology from 
biology in a restrictive sense; i. e., biology of actual living 
organisms, which supposes them as the result of an evolutie 
nary process and even knows the very process described by 
paleontologists, although without connection in many cases. 
Such a biology is normally called neontology and it is the 
opposite of paleontology (of paleobiology, more exactly). 
Neontology studies only a very thin temporal stratum -the 
present- of the whole history of life on the Earth. That is very 
important aspects such as evolutionary trends, evolutionary 
rates, emergency of higher taxonomic categories, and so on 
are only possible to see and face them in a paleobiological 
context with neontological foundations. On the other hand, 
ecological changes along the geological time -they are not 
similar to those of the c!assical succession(Gould, 1980 a)- 
would be a specific object for paleobiology too, which could 
not be covered by ordinary ecology. 
In this sense, the proposition of this paradigm is really 
exciting. Multiple problems arise when we consider life in 
geological time. They are problems that need solution and 
that they can have it. In fact, we have an open theory embryo, 
and that is a contition for the paradigm; this can attract the 
intelligence of the youth, anxious fordisplaying their creati- 
ves energies. However, bad habits are a big load on us; 1 spoke 
before about «direct reading of nature» and such a «reading» 
is a very troubling charge and it goes on loading very much our 
minds. Paleontologists are still very compromised with the 
belief on «brut facts»; that is to say, fossils in succession. 1 
want to bring here a beautiful example about this: fossils in 
succession appearently show a progressive increase of orga- 
nic diversity in geological time; this is a «brut fact», but as 
Raup and Stanley (1978) remark, the outcrop conditions 
seem to represent the execution of a rarefaction experience by 
the Nature (rarefaction is a statistical tool which predicts the 
composition of samples more and more little from a known 
universe), and if it is so, the progressive diversity is only 
apparent; this means that a same «brut fact», considered from 
sound theory could represent something against «common 
sense» or ((cornrnon knowledge)). After this little disgression, 
1 want to make some remarks; 1 do not know what is the 
worse, if to embrace «classical» and inductivistic points of 
view of paleontology or embrace superficially those modern 
concepts, which 1 consider as a new paradigm for paleobie 
logy. This frivolous way of work malres me suppose, in many 
cases, that nothing has changed, except the form of showing 
the facts, a more elegant and less boring one. We can speak, 
from a «classical» position, on functional morphology, 
paleoecology, phylogeny, and so on; they are beautiful 
ornaments to add to papers and monographs. The paradigm 
fails, thus, in its psychological objetive; we go on organizing 
paleontology around objects more than ideas, as eight years 
ago Schopf(1972) stated; in the present year, Gould(1980 a) 
says that «we can inouth Kuhnian modemisms about the role 
of theory, but we remain inductivists in our heart of hearts)). 1 
would like to be wrong, but perhaps, many of these observa- 
tions could be very well applied to spanish paleontology, 
although there are many hopeful exceptions to this sad rule. 
1 want to say something about the propositions of Gould 
(1980 a): these are referred to an higher leve1 of paleobiole 
gical synthesis; i. e., that that involves geological and not 
ecological time -that is to say, the very object of paleobie 
logy, as considerrd in this paper- for evolutionary and 
paleoecological studies. We cannot extrapolate, for instance, 
concepts of ecological succession --colonization by p i e  
neers, ...- to a temporal strata sequence in a basin. The 
ecological succession events are given in the ecological time; 
nevertheless, the events here considered, take place in the 
geological time. Mere analogies cannot bring us to the error of 
supposing that both kinds of events are interpretable in the 
same way (briefly, it has no logical support that the phase of 
colonization by pioneers had a duration of some hundred of 
thousand -or even some millions- of years). However, in 
the kind of paleontology that we practice in Spain, we are not 
yet in conditions of attacking problems of this class, but we 
can -and it is wholly necessary- attack punctual paleobie 
logical problerns. This is related with the statement b), at the 
beginning of this paragraph: we cannot yet speak on biostra- 
tigraphy without paleobiology, except that we desire to go on 
into the routine. 1 want to explain inyself in private and 
informal conversations with spanish paleontologists (above 
all, with those who have the directioii -from the places of 
major responsibility- of the paleontological research), they 
told me on many occasions that it is necessary previously to 
make systematic monographs about the various fossil taxa of 
Spain. This is so in other countries since the past century. 1 
consider the true and urgent need of such monographs. More, 
1 trhink that a work in this sense is a good exercise for any 
future paleontologisi, because it serves for familiarizing him 
with fossils and itspaleobiological meaning atzdproblems, 
because -and this is the nucleus of the question- systematic 
problems involve problems on the form and its generation, its 
phylogenetical history and the whole range of restrictions that 
affected the form during its construction; systematic pro- 
blems involve, on the other hand, ecological and biogeogra- 
phical ones. Al1 that which is not in this way means a 
regression towards an old systematics of typological or 
nominalistical conceptions, which nobody claims today 
seriously. As biostratigraphy founds the goodness of its
dating, in a great part, in the goodness of the species that
determines the biostratigrapher, it is very necessary to take in
account all the biological implications that the modern
concept of species brings itself. It is enough that any neophyte
reads shallowly a classical as Mayr (1969) for realizing him
on the existence of the very important ecological, evolutio-
nary and biogeographical phenomenon called subspeciation,
whose lack of valoration can conduce to the illusion of facing
new species; of such «new species» unfortunately, the fossil
record is densely overcrowded. At the same time, the confu-
sion of clines with phyletic transformations can drive us to
consider successions, with appearance of gradual change, as
evolutionary phenomena. The consequence of such a confu-
sion —for the lovers of the appLcation of fossils to dating of
rocks— will be that of giving as heterochronous beds those
which really should be considered as isochronous ones.
And the consequence of all this is, at least in our country
(unfortunately, I guess that many criticisms that I have made
from a real knowledge of facts, would be applicable to the way
of making paleontology in other countries; however, as I have
no occasion of doing concrete constatations, I prefer, at the
moment, to centre myself in the case of spanish paleontology),
to do these paleontological monographs and biostratigraphi-
cal researches, except in those hopeful exceptions that I
talked before, can mean a double worlc the finished mono-
graphs or papers can show their lack of paleobiological
foundations, whose result will be serious incoherences in the
geological applications that we hoped from these works.
Thus, this will mean to make all the work again —or in a great
part—, because much of it will not be suitable in a short
periode of time. The pure and simple morphology can serve
very little, if it is not enlighted by a real comprehension of its
meaning. And this meaning, let's not deceive ourselves, is a
biological one. In many cases, paleontologists baptise again
the old species with the new generic names from the Theatise
on Invertebrate Paleontology, or other books, if they are
dealing with vertebrate or plant fossils; this can be an illusion
of progress, but if all is reduced to this, it will only be as I say:
pure illusion.
TERATOLOGY OF PALEONTOLOGY
Paleontology, like an organism, is developing itself. It is
evident that such a development, if it is not carried on
harmoniously, can result in grave malformations that do not
allow the survival of the organism which possesses them. We
have seen that the new ideas can be used as a frivolous mode,
and here is the danger. Little by little, it seems that the modern
is being introduced. Nevertheless, how is it introduced? and
above all, how is it used?
I think that a good point of departure, apart from the
interest of paleontologists for the biological concepts which
can be interesting in their activity, would consist in centring
their daily work in four important points, on which I shall
comment a little.
1. Taphonomy. After all that is said, anyone can think that
a correct taphonomical study is the sine qua non condition for
a well founded paleontological study —paleobiological one
as well as of application in other fields of geology—. I do not
want to be insistent, but I desire to remark that the absence of
a determined fossil in a bed is necessary to evaluate it.
Biostratinomical phenomena can destroy concrete kinds of
fossils before they become buried ( so, species of little size,
with hard parts built with instable material, young forms, and
so on). This is very important before inferring consequences,
in paleobiology ( evaluation of population dynamics in fossil
populations, evaluation of diversity and structure of old
ecosystems, etc.) as well as biostratigraphy (determined
index fossils, like planktonic forams). If our taphonomical
study is consistent with the hypothesis of the possible
destruction of some species or determined young specimens,
we must abstain from making concrete statements about the
fossil assemblage which we are studying. Only when the
taphonomical study does not show conditions that mean the
necessary destruction of some concrete forms, then we can
judge such an absence from a pelobiological point of view.
This last one will be very important when make biostrati-
graphy: an index fossil cannot appear in a bed for two reasons;
the first one is because this bed has not the age indicated by the
index fossil; the second one is because the considered species
could have been incompatible in the ecosystem which existed
in that place of the Earth or simply, because the species could
not arrive there for biogeographical reasons (barriers). It is
evident that the analysis of these two last paleobiological
points of view can bring us to decide if the considered species
could live in that place or not. If it could really live there, then
its absence can be evaluated as true —thus, the corresponding
bed can be considered as anterior to the appearing of this
species or posterior to its extinction—, but if this absence can
be inferred to by reasons of competition or biogeographic
barriers ( see Valentine, 1977), then we must abstain from
basing the age of that bed in the absence of the considered
index fossil.
The previous considerations show as taphonomy and
paleobiology are interrelated in the most common applica-
tions to geology. There should be paid more attention to
taphonomy; sedimentary petrologists study many diageneti-
cal processes that affect organic remains in the rocks, but
biostratinomy is not practiced so intensely. For a review on
biostratinomy, with abundant bibliography, see Martinell, et
al. (1980).
2. Populations and samples. It is not useless to remember
that a species is a set of populations displayed on a
geographical area, with real or potential gene flow among
them, and reproductively isolated from other similar sets. If
these populations are distributed on more or less wide areas,
environmental heterogeneity will be more a rule than an
exception, and the populations of this species become
adapted to these conditions. Those populations submitted to a
common patern of environmental conditions inside that area,
will tend towards a similar pattern of adaptation. This pattern
will be often reflected in the morphology of the individuals of
the considered populations. This makes that the species'
morphology varies from one place to another inside the area
of distribution, forming groups of populations, related to
geographical places, with uniform morphology; these groups
are subspecies of considered species. Between two of such
areas we shall find transitional morphologies. At the same
time, if there is an environmental factor with a gradient in a
determined direction in the range of distribution of a species,
we shall observe morphological gradients or clines, which will
be in geographical correspondence with the factor gradient.
The subspeciation can be still more complex than we show it
here, but perhaps it is enough for beginning. Selection and
mutation events in populations and subspeciation can be
explained in the frame of the synthetic theory of evolution.
The paleontological consequences of all this are very
important. In the first place, it is necessary to classify species
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according to these criteria. The existence of a homogeneous 
population, morphologically different from other populations 
of a given species, is not enough for deciding if it belongs to 
another species different from that If two morphotypes of a 
same genera coexist in a same area and there are constant and 
accused differences among their individuals, we can think 
reasonably in a case of ((displacement character)) (see 
Schindel and Gould, 1977), which assures us that we are 
really in the presence of two different species; the converse 
test is to search in areas where only we shall find one of the 
two morphotypes; in such a case of separated areas, the 
different populations will show morphological convergences. 
When we find separated fossil populations which present 
morphological differences between them, we must take care 
in saying that one of them-if it is morphologically unknown- 
is a new species. The paleobiogeographical context of forms 
of the same age can be a good guide for our decision. It is true 
that there could be important losses in the fossil record, but if 
populations -with intermediate morphology between those 
considered as typical and the problematic form- appear in 
outcrops of the same age, then we can think that this last one is 
rather a subspecies of that well known. 
This is important for biostratigraphy: it is a very dangerous 
affair to differentiate taxa for defining divisions of the geologi- 
cal time. There is a circular reasoning inherent to it: age is de- 
fined by fossils, but after fossils are defined by age. There are 
paleontologists who, unconsciously, reason like this. It is very 
possible that phyletic gradualism, that we often invoke, is the 
responsible of this kind of biostratigraphical reasoning -in 
the sense of associating a little change to irreversible evolu- 
tion and thus, to the time-. 1 was criticised(in my Pk D., De 
Renzi, 1972) for considering as synonimous -previous 
consultation with Dr. M. Glibert and direct comparison with 
specimens of type- the meridional species Turritella trem- 
pina Carez and the meridional species II: dixoni Deshayes. 
Criticism (from the french colleagues) were in the sense that 
we -Dr. Glibert and my- have no in account the strati- 
graphicalpart of the problem for both species. This discus- 
sion was some years ago; now this could be seen as a beautiful 
exarnple of morphological stasis. 
However, the biological species is based on the population 
concepc the knowledge of the population includes the 
intrapopulational variabilty, dynamics and life history strate- 
gies. Only careful sampling plans of units as concrete as 
possible can give us idea on al1 this aspects. It is evident that 
the fossil population is something interpreted by us in each 
fossil assemblage (Fagerstrom, 1964; De Renzi, et al., 
1975); the fossil asemblage is restricted to a narrow strati- 
graphic interna1 and to a very determined geographical area. 
As a narrow stratigraphical interval is thought -ideally- 
something like to a single bed. In this cases, the sample is 
convenient to be as punctual as possible, for avoiding mixing 
of generations (the fossil assemblage would represent, in 
general, a natural sample of old ecosystems, with more or less 
<cselection» operations -biostratinomical or diagenetical 
destruction, transport, etc.- whose maximum leve1 action 
would tend to minimize highly the relation between the 
assemblage and the primitive ecosystem). The need of 
random sampling (simple, systematic, stratified and cluster), 
is very important for setting questions on fossil populations. 
For a determined purpose it is necessary some concrete 
sampling plan, but not whatever. Thus, it would be sufficient a 
ramdom simple sampling in a fossil assemblage for telling 
something about mean values, covariances and correlations 
of biometrical magnitudes from different growth stages in a 
population. However, elucidation of regular changes in time 
or in space in populations of a given species needs systematic 
random sampling and so on (the classical work Krumbein 
and Graybill (1965) provides the base for good sampling 
plans). 
Another important aspect involved in this discussion is that 
of working with individuals from a population groz~ped in 
growth stages. I t  is obvious when we evaluate population 
dynamics (it is always possible if we, in turn, can decide that 
taphonomical processes did not affect the young individuals, 
because if these processes eliminated forms of little size, such 
a study is absurd), but it is also very important for biometrical 
studies: about this theme, see Gould (1966, 1970) and De 
Renzi and Martinell (1979). It cannot make biometrical 
comparisons among species with samples which have mixed 
individuals of different ages. A sarnple from a population 
must be divided in subsamples in relation to age. Thus, we 
must compare the subsamples of the same age from different 
populations (or individuals with the same major dimension, 
as alternative). 
A last point the most of organisms, when they grow, 
become deformed(they alter their relative proportions among 
their magnitudes); this is known as allometric and anisometric 
growths). For this cause, it is absurd to apply simple linear 
regression to bivariate plots between biometrical magnitudes, 
for young and adult individuals, from a population (in this 
case it is obviously necessary the mixing of measures, 
because we are interested in the whole growth). Margalef 
(1 95 3) remarked this question in neontology -although 
allometric growth was treated during the first half of this 
century- because it have received little attention from many 
systematists, which went on defining species by means of 
index (quocient between magnitudes); it is absurd, because 
the index varies if the form changes during the growth. 
3. Substantive unz~ormitarianisin. 1 treated this theme 
anteriorly in another paper (De Renzi, 1978) and 1 am going 
to refer to it in a good part The distinction between a blind 
uniformitarianism, which is limited to export actual processes 
and their rates to the past, without any kind of valuation, anda 
more critica1 position, it is something advised severa1 times 
(Lawrence, 197 1 ; Gould in Valentine, 1973). Such a kind of 
actuation is that which Gould has called substantive unifor- 
mitarianism. 1 would prefer to j maintain the distinction 
accomplished by Hooykaas (1 963) between actualism (which 
is only referred to acting causes; actualism means that the 
same causes which act in the presenf acted in the past) and 
uniformitarism (which is distinguished from the common 
term uniformitarianism, that involves actual causes and their 
uniformity for the anglkaxon geologists and paleontologists; 
uniformitarism is related with the rates of the processes, 
without changes during the geological time). 
Thus, we must speak separately of substantive actualism 
and uniformitarism. The use of substantive actualism (or 
uniformitarism) means untested hypothesis, and this is the 
most important failure of such an image or model of the 
Nature. If the acting causes (and their rates) on the Earth and 
the biosphere have remained constant in al1 their levels, it 
must be tested, because it is only aiz hypothesis, it is not a 
natural law (Hooykaas). However, the history of the Earth 
and life could not be investigated without a guide of aspects 
that could have remained constant during the geological 
times. Natural laws are proved as such laws because they 
can apply to a crowd of very different situations and in very 
dzrerent times. These natural laws are that which we can 
consider reasonably as constant in the time. This is explained 
because those laws are founded on immanentproperties (as 
expressed by George Gaylord Simpson) of matter and 
energy; this iz; valid for the Earth and life which is developed 
on i t  Life has several properties which reasonably must be 
considered as invariable ones; if these properties would have 
changed duriiig the geological tinies, paleontology would not 
be possible. The constant properties for life would be the 
following ones: reproduction of individuals similar to their 
parents; similarity is based on prc~tein replication by means of 
BNA moleciiles and in the lirnited valid interactions of gene 
products among them, wkich gives as result the adult form; 
another aspect is the organizatiori on the Earth of ecosystems 
composed of populations -constituted by individuals- of 
different species; tiese ecosystems have the property of 
autorregulation; this last one is c:onsequence of the supposi- 
tion of each individual nourrishes itself, and those of a 
determined population are part of a more general trophic 
structure. If we suppose that fossils mean old organic 
remains, al1 these statements caribe applied to them. We see 
at once that +he simultaneous action of immanent properties 
in determined conditions results in an immanent process 
(thus, the limitation of genic interactions in the development 
of an organism, because it is oxily viable a single principal 
manner, this would be the cause of its immanency. The 
intemporality of natural laws and this of the resultant 
processes of their acting in detennined conditions, is the base 
of that which Gould calls methodological uniformitaria- 
nism and that we would distinguiish in two separared aspects: 
~nethodological actualism and methodological uniformi- 
tarism. The methodological approach is, in our opinion, the 
correct one. 
We can see now many processes on the emerged lands and 
in the seas, whose character is possible to show as an 
immanent oiie. We have only their responses recorded as 
fossils and sedimentary rocks. Vire must set thus, hypothesis 
or models wl~ich allow to explain causally -not as a «black 
box»- the observed effects or responses. Such models can be 
formulated on the grounds of tl+,ose immanent properties or 
processes which we suppose to give the observed effects. In 
these conditions, the process vrill be the hypothesis to be 
tested as compatible with those responses. Johnson (1960) 
gave three models, with the posisible responses in each case, 
for testing transport and exposition in fossil assemblages. 
Now, 1 would like to express aome criticisms about certain 
kinds of practicing paleontology. These kinds involve subs- 
tantive actuiilism (and uniformitarism); perhaps, it is not so, 
but there is no apparently another clear alternative. Thus, 
Murray (1 97'9), although he spe aks of adaptations, which are 
impressrd cin the shell morphology of forarniniferids, he 
finishes statiing that, although ralationships between assem- 
blages of living and fossil benthic forams are complex, it is 
still possible to use benthic forams for paleoecological 
interpretations of old deposits: (dhe ease of interpretation is 
greatest for Neogene depositi;. Because of evolutionary 
changes, the interpretations are more subjective for Mesozoic 
deposits and even more so for those of the Paleozoic)). 
Murray uses the taxonomical category of genus in his 
interpretatioas. In my opinion, [ think that it would be again 
substantive ~zctzialism and untformitarism. Genus is a group 
of species related very closely; kiowever, these species do not 
mean necesr;arily only one kind of adaptations. The morpho 
logical similarity of many specic:~ inside each genus conside- 
red as a good environmental msirker, would be a reflect their 
similarity of adaptation, and in many cases we would apply 
this last corisequence, althougki it would be an inconscious 
application. However, such a statement should be tested. 
Severa1 delicate characters of foram shells should be tested as 
dependent on chlorinity, temperature, and so on, and this 
could illuminate many things about these questions. On the 
other han4 although Murray argues that the application of his 
interpretations to assemblages of Mesozoic and Paleozoic 
benthic forams would be very subjective, 1 think that it would 
be not advisable, because, as he says, evolutionary differen- 
ces with actual forams should be very importanc such 
differences would mean unknown adaptive differences; these 
last one however, can be investigated, and this research must 
be based on morphology. Nurnerous papers have tried to light 
immanent properties of the organic form and their possible 
investigation on fossils. Such a way can show the adaptive 
features and causal environmental correlations of the organic 
form; thus, it can show us modes of life and, as a consequence, 
valid environmental indications. 
In another recent paper (Parker, 1979) is stated explicitly, 
referring to molluscs, that ((modern shallow-water species of 
mollusks, for instance, have remained relatively unchanged in 
externa1 morphology and by inference, therefore, in their life 
processes since middle Miocene times. Many have close 
relatives from Eocene times» (the underlined is mine). The 
reasons seems more interesting, but 1 go on thinking that only 
the investigation of the meaning of the organic form could 
make clear us, in a more convenient manner, the problem. 
Al1 these questions are not new ones. Lawrence (1 97 1) 
remarked already the invalidity of the more frequent paleu 
ecological reconstructions, founded on the indiscriminate 
exportation of properties of actual organisms to the past This 
it the substantive actualism and unifonnitarism. He criticized 
rightly the inference of the old environment based on the 
following reasoning: the fossils of a given deposit -as living 
organisms- would be similar -in environmental requisi- 
tes- to their nearest actual relatives. It is not necessary to 
comment this reasoning. Referring to fossil brachiopods, 
Ager (1965) said that «paleontologists cannot live by unifor- 
mitarianism alone. There is ample evidence to suggest that 
the brachiopods have -for the most part- changed both 
their habits and their distribution since Mesozoic times. 
Comparison with what little is known about modern brachie 
pods is full of difficulties and inadequacies. On the whole it is 
much better to look at the evidence provided by the fossils 
themselves)). We think that these statements do not need any 
kind of comment after al1 this discussion; they should have in 
account by al1 the paleontologists. 
4. Biostatistics. Statistics, in paleontology, is a tool which 
serves for answering very primary questions. The most 
sophisticated methods of multivariate analysis are referred, in 
many cases, to know, for instance, if there are significant 
simultaneous differences among severa1 populations, based 
on a series of magnitudes which we think they are important in 
the taxonomy of that group. In other cases, statistics serves us 
for seeing structures and relationships among variates taken 
on organisms, populations or ecosystems; however, such 
variates are seen before as important ones in the respective 
biological theory. 
Statistics in an important technique (Bunge, 1969); in this 
sense, it helps us in the testing of determined hypothesis 
formulated in the teoretical contexts of our sciences. These 
hypothesis are those which involve samples of populations, 
where determined parameters of biological importance in the 
population, are part, because their nature, of probability 
distributions of variates measured on such populations (1 
consider here «population» as the statistical concepc «biolo 
gical population» would be one of its correlates). That I try to
say, definitively, is that statistics is not an «universal
panacea» which could serve us for avoiding the work of
creating and testing hypothesis. It is simply another testing
technique. Quantitative data are, on the other hand, para-
phrasing Gould (1980 a), only other data, although they
could allow a great conceptual precision. If data are not
related to the corresponding theoretical context, they would
be, in general, a poor information.
I would like to remark again that statistics serves us for
seeing features of our quantitative (and also qualitative) data,
which are not detectable in a simple glance on our laboratory
or field tables. More, it would be something temerary and not
advisable to act only guided by the first glance on the data
arrays. However, to accept significant differences, for instan-
ce, or correlations, and so on, that statistics could supply us,
without an analysis in our theoretical context, it is also
absurd. Scott (1980) points out the possible lack of theoreti-
cal bases in the «widespread use of gross dimensions and
similar point-to-point measurements in biometric studies»
and he considers such a practice as due to instrumental
limitations and preceding studies; he claims that it is better, in
a theoretical sense, the study of outlines and applies it to
Globorotalia puncticulata (Deshayes).
Thus, significant differences do not indicate, automatically,
taxonomic differences at the species level. It is necessary to
explicit, in the first place, the sympatric or allopatric charac-
ter of the considered populations; the taxonomical value of the
characters which we use for distinguishing those populations,
and so on. Sylvester-Bradley (1977) criticizes Brinkmann's
ideas on Kosmoceras; Brinkmann thought to reognize very
well five phylogenetical lines in the Oxford Clay (middle
Jurassic) at the English locality of Peterborough. It is a
classical and very cited example. Brinkmann recorded spe-
cimens and he placed each one of them in those five groups;
these groups, however, were subjective ones and «as Callo-
mon (1963) points out, having thus imposed a classification
on his material, it is hardly surprising that the satatistics
confirmed it!». Thus, it is very important to have very clear
that it is in the core of the respective biological theories, where
we obtain the variates with biological meaning ( systematics,
ecology, etc.) and it is on these where we shall apply the
statistical concepts.
* * *
I think that these four points are very primary and they
should have in account by the paleontologists in their daily
work. There exist many more points, but in my opinion, these
four would be the more urgent. Any departure from them will
be the origin of abnormal developments in paleontology
which shall not be able to survive. Unfortunately, it seems
that «the modern» has become a mode, and this is the worse
could occur, because are derived paleobiological consequen-
ces without having in account all the requisites for making a
correct paleontological work. Normally, many authors do not
show in their papers some important points of their researches
which, perhaps, would make them invalid ones. Thus,
criticism becomes very difficult. However, a correct record of
data in the area which was investigated, it is sufficient in
general for the discredit of a bad work.
EPILOGUE
Epistemological and methodological questions are gene-
rally very useful when a science is searching for its founda-
tions. This is the case of paleontology. Paleontology is a
phoenix that is born again from its ashes; an utilitarian fire
destroyed it in the second half of the past century. Our science
tries to come back to its natural contacts with biology, and
biology has advanced very much as a science since that
epoch. Biology is gone far away from pure facts and it is trying
to constitute itself as a scientifical theory. However, although
paleontology must take many the new concepts created by
biology in this interval of time, biology is not complete
without paleontology. Paleontology, in its time, set the
problem of the extinction and, as a consequence, that of the
origin of species, which was the origin of one of the theories
which is considered as unifying of biology: the evolution
theory. For this reason, I think that it is not concevaible a
science of biology without paleontology today (paleontology
must not be only a simple «intellectual curiosity» for
biologists). Paleontology supplies explicitly the temporal
dimension to the study of life; our actual vision in biology is
placed in the ecological time, something like to one microse-
cond, if we consider the whole temporal rank of the history of
life on the Earth. I think rather than we must speak on
neontology and paleontology; both study complementary
aspects of life on the Earth. About it, I desire to make a not
traditional suggestion: the introduction of paleontology, in an
obligatory manner, in the universitary studies of biology.
According to all that I have said in this paper, biology without
a temporal dimension; e. neontology, it is something
incomplete. The possibility of paleobiology as a nomothetic
science has been explicited sufficiently by Gould (1980 a);
here I think that I have not to comment anything more about
this question. The reading of this Gould' s paper by any
biologist conscious of the scientific character of his work, can
suggest him a deep reflection on the signification of the
correct study of fossils in biology.
Unfortunately, I think that this is utopic now. There are
many exceptions: in several countries, included ours, there
are paleontologists coming from the field of the biological
sciences. Nevertheless, the most of paleontologists have
realized our formation in the field of geology. After there has
emerged a variable conscience about the primarily biological
character of the affairs with which we treated. In many cases,
however, the most part of paleontologists are true collectio-
nists of stamps —any variation in the characters of fossils
becomes the origin of a new taxon— and the maxium
achievement is a bad systematic work. In these cases it plays
an important role the desire of creating new species, genera,
and so on. This reflects a false concept of scientific discovery,
whose more delator translation is that of the sentence «new
species for Science» (yes, Science in capital letters). On the
other hand, that utilitarian fire has converted paleontology in
a mere auxiliar of stratigraphy, and this auxiliary character is
becoming worse and worse. It is necessary to remember to all
those that use fossils for stratigraphical purposes, that fossils
had been living organisms, not coins or stamps. Only in this
way they can be used as good tools for dating rocks, because
they, as such organisms, belonged to populations of species
integrated in old ecosystems and occupied a variable biogeo-
graphical rank in a determined interval of the geological time.
All these factors, and the previous possibility (or impossibi-
lity) of preservation, must be have in account when we work in
biostratigraphy; if we do not act in this sense, we shall only
accumulate printed paper which the time will discredit it.
If paleontology passes from a protoscientific stage to a
scientific one, it is very necessary to explicit and, above all, to
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apply the scientific method in it. There are no pure descrip 
tions nor pure data record; Rudwick and Gould have shown 
us that in a very demonstrative and authentic way for 
paleontology in their critical and historic papers. 1 think that 
is not necessary to insist more about iS the papers of these 
authors woulti be according to a good sector of the soundest 
actual philosophy of science; they sustain their thought in it. 
Their merit is to have known how applying the concepts of 
philosophy of'science to a critical revision of paleontology. If 
paleontology should remain during severa1 or many years as a 
fee of faculties or high schools of geology -except those 
cases of pale~ontologists coming from the biological field or 
paleontology practiced in biological universitary or research 
centres- it is necessary to make conscious the geologists in a 
very concrete sense: geological tbiought is essential in paleon- 
tology, but iri a secondary leve1 (as physics or chemistry in 
geology or biology). Fossils are not understandable out of a 
geological context (sedimentologic, tectonic, paleogeogra- 
phic, and so cin), but, in first place, they have to be considered 
as that they are: as remains of old organisms, and this is 
radically a biological question. 'Che geologist seems, on the 
other hand, absurdly reluctant fcir understanding that it must 
be so. It is very much easy to meke understand to a biologist 
the need of studying sedimentology and historical geology for 
good paleontological research, than a geologist understands 
the need of a good biological foundation for this kind of 
investigations. 
1 do not want to insist more on these questions of 
scientifical politic; 1 think that along this paper have been 
explicited its bases enough. 1 do not desire to be dogmatist, 
although 1 declare that 1 have a deep faith in the form of 
conceiving paleontology that 1 have exposed in the previous 
paragraphs. The display of paleontological works and the 
judgement oi' them through the liistory of science will be, at 
least, that wlhich will pronounce the last word. 
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